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Riley: Prosecution History Estoppel: The Choice Between Public Interest

PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL:
THE CHOICE BETWEEN PUBLIC INTERESTS
AND INVENTOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States patent system was considered so important by the
Founders of this country that they conferred upon Congress the
constitutional power to grant patents in order to promote the
advancement of science and the arts.'
To achieve this desired
advancement, Congress enacted a system that offers a quid pro quo: in
order to secure patent rights, the inventor must in return give a full
disclosure of the invention to the public. 2 By adding the inventor's new
knowledge to the public store, the system promotes the technological
advancement of all civilization for the relatively low cost of a short wait
in order to utilize that knowledge freely . . . forever. 3 However, this
constitutional mandate is currently threatened by the recent Federal
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress shall have the power "[tbo promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. In his brief discussion of
the patent clause of the Constitution, James Madison wrote in THE FEDERALIST:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The
right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The
states cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance
of congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 338 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1873). For a general history of the development of intellectual property rights from
ancient times, see F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 106 (1952).
2
See generally RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTIONER'S GUIDE 1 (2d ed. 1993).
A patent is a contract between an inventor and the United States government
under which the government grants the inventor a limited monopoly. The
limited monopoly gives the inventor the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling a claimed invention in the United States for [twenty] years. In
return for these patent rights, the inventor discloses the complete invention to
the public in order to promote the progress of science.
Id.
3 See, e.g., Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the
Fountainhead? 49 CASE W. L. REV. 509, 512 (1999) (describing the public disclosure of the
patented technology as a building block for future technological advances). The current
patent term is twenty years from the date of application with some adjustments that can be
made to compensate for delays caused by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-55 (2000).
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Circuit ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 4
which essentially eviscerated the doctrine of equivalents ("DOE" or
"equivalents") by overemphasizing prosecution history estoppel ("PHE"
or "estoppel") and subsequently turning a patent into a nearly useless
piece of paper that protects an inventor from only the dullest and rarest
type of literal copying.
The patent system that Congress erected serves two main competing
functions: first, to protect the inventor's rights to the benefits of his or
her invention, and second, to put the public on notice as to the bounds of
the patentee's property rights.5 On the one hand, patentees must "point
out with particularity" and claim their invention in order to put the
public on notice as to the bounds of their property rights.6 On the other
hand, in order to protect the inventor's rights from the vagaries of
language, the courts have allowed the inventor to assert exclusionary
rights over other technologies that may not be exactly identical to what
234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
5 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (noting "[tjhe
doctrine of equivalents is often said to breed tension between competing policy concerns.
These policy concerns are often described as 'clear notice' to the public and the polar
'fairness' to the patentee."); see also Scott P. Zimmerman, Note, Hughes Aircraft and the
Warner-Jenkinson Presmnption: The Certiorari That Should Have Been, 40 IDEA 131, 132-33
(2000); Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution, History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson, 111
HARv. L. REV. 2330, 2330 (1998) [hereinafter Note]. These two competing functions often
come into direct conflict during an infringement action in the courts. See generally 3 PETER
D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17.01 (2d ed. 2000). The patentee will try to
prevent an accused infringer from producing or selling technology that the patentee
believes is the same basic technology that the patent protects. Id. The infringer will claim
that the technology at issue is not the same because it is not exactly what the patent claims.
Id. Both sides, of course, will often truly believe that they are in the right, and that the
other side is in the wrong. Id.
638 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (1994) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention."). The rationale behind the particularity requirement is that the
public deserves clear notice of what the patentee claims as his invention in order to
compete in the marketplace without the fear of being accused of infringing upon the
patentee's proprietary claims. See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 132-33. Because of the
many different people who may read and need to understand the patent, the importance of
drafting a well written patent that both clearly and eloquently conveys to potential readers
what the invention is cannot be overstated. See STEPHEN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS
HANDBOOK § 1.011] (8th ed. 1999). Those people include the patent examiner, who must

ultimately accept or reject the patent application; a person skilled in the art, who will want
to learn how to make and use the new technology; other patent agents and attorneys, who
will need to use the patent as a reference; judges, who will have to preside over patent
disputes; jury members, who are ordinary citizens answering questions of fact in a patent
trial; and prospective competitors, who must try to avoid infringement of the patented
technology. Id.
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the patent claims spell out, but are substantially similar. 7 It is under
these circumstances that the courts are faced with applying the

competing DOE and PHE theories in order to reach an equitable result.8
In the long anticipated decision of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., 9 the Supreme Court addressed both issues. 10 The
holding, however, did little more than to reaffirm the DOE as good law."
The decision also presented a new theory for PHE: the rebuttable
presumption that a claim amendment was made for substantial reasons
related to patentability. 12 This left many questions unanswered, not the

least of which is how to functionally implement the DOE and PHE to
achieve both policy objectives, while still maintaining some minimum
13
quantum of certainty and predictability.
In its November 2000 decision, made only three years after WarnerJenkinson, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made its first
7 See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 232-33. The particularity requirement burdens the
inventor with the uncertain task of trying to accurately and effectively describe a new
technological advance in the limited and inexact medium of words. Id. "The doctrine of
equivalents (or something akin to the doctrine of equivalents) must exist to protect
patentees from the vagaries of language." Id.; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). Justice Jackson set forth the reasoning of the Court
for the DOE as follows:
[To permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant in a hollow and
useless thing.... Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type
of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of
verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him
of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than
disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent
system.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
a See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 5.
9 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
10 Id.
For some years prior to the Warner-lenkinson decision, patent attorneys and
commentators had questioned whether the DOE had survived the 1952 Patent Act. See,
e.g., infra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in the
Warner-Jenkinson case).
11See infra
notes 91-104 and accompanying text; see also Toshiko Takenaka, The Doctrine of
Equivalents After Warner-Jenkinson: Questions Solved and Unresolved, 3 INT'L PERSP. INTELL.
PROP.
26 (1997).
12 See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court explicitly left the
details of what procedures should be used to implement the DOE up to the Federal Circuit.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (stating that "[w]e leave it to the Federal Circuit how
best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and
reviewability to this area of the law").
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concerted effort to overhaul the DOE in light of the controlling
precedent. 14 The court accomplished this by limiting the application of
the DOE through dramatic alterations of PHE law.15 The court reversed
a seventeen-year-old precedent relating to the way the courts protect an
inventor's patented right to exclude others from making or using his
invention by overturning the use of PHE as a flexible bar to the DOE in
favor of a strict bar.' 6 The ruling requires a court to ignore any
equivalency between a patent's claim element that has been narrowed
during prosecution of an accused infringer. 17 This ruling, although made
under the rubric of promoting public certainty of the boundaries of a
patent's protection, has used a stone ax where a surgeon's scalpel is
required. 18 In its zeal to promote public (and judicial) certainty with an
easy to apply elementary patent analysis, the Federal Circuit has tied the
hands of lower courts by not allowing them to inquire into the fine
nuances and subtleties that surround the manner in which a patent is
issued and then applied to allow an inventor to capitalize on his
invention.' 9 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and is in a
position to both clearly demarcate the doctrinal law regarding PHE, and
clarify the underlying public policy relationship between the DOE and
PHE.20 This Note proposes that the Supreme Court should reverse the
Federal Circuit's decision in part, re-assert that the preferred public
policy should tip in favor of strong patent protection of the inventor's
rights, establish a specific and flexible bar test for determining when
prosecution history estops a patentee from asserting the DOE, and
explicitly enunciate that Section 112 rejections and objections are not
substantiallyrelated to patentability.
Part II of this Note lays the legal foundation for this proposition by
discussing the lineage of both the DOE and PHE, the Warner-Jenkinson
decision itself, and finally, the Federal Circuit's Festo decision.21 Part III
14Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Koguo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
15See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
16 Festo, 234 F.3d at 574 (expressly rejecting the flexible bar approach that originated in
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
17 See, e.g., Lockeed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (woodenly applying PHE to an element even where it was clear that the limitations
added during prosecution had nothing to do with the limitation at issue in the litigation);
see also infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
18 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 575 (stating that the notice function of patent claims has become
paramount and requires greater predictability than the flexible bar can give).
19See supra note 17.
20Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
21See infra notes 25-127 and accompanying text.
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analyzes the Federal Circuit's decision to create a strict bar to equivalents
for all claim elements that are subject to PHE in view of both policy
arguments and then by analyzing a subsequent decision controlled by
the Festo decision. 22 Part IV proposes an alternative theory for limiting
the DOE with PHE that is more consistent with the Supreme Court's
prior holdings. 23 Part V concludes with a brief summary. 24
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

PHE is inextricably intertwined with the DOE, and a discussion of
one must necessarily include the other, due to the fact that the
2
development of the DOE was the impetus for the development of PHE. 5
The parallel development of these doctrines reflects the underlying

tension inherent in American patent principles. On the one hand, the
DOE is meant to protect the inventor's rights to his invention, without
being subject to the vagaries of language. 26 On the other hand, PHE is
meant to help the public identify the boundaries of an inventor's
exclusionary rights in order to facilitate the development of new
technology. 27 The need to balance between the inventor's right to his
invention and the public's need for notifications of the boundaries of the
invention has produced these competing doctrines. 8
The DOE is a judicially-created equitable doctrine used by a patentee
to assert patent infringement. 29 The policy behind the doctrine is to
12 See

infra notes 128-250 and accompanying text.

23 See
24 See

infra notes 251-95 and accompanying text.
mfra notes 296-304 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., John F. Sweeney & James F. Bush, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution
History Estoppel: What has Warner-Jenkinson Changed? 573 PLI/PAT. 135, 137-38 (1999)
(discussing how the two doctrines are interrelated). It is universally recognized in the
patent bar that PHE exists solely as a limitation on the DOE. See, e.g., Speech of the Honorable
Paul R. Michel Givet to the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association, 9 FED. CIR. B.J.
139, 141 (1999) (discussing various legal bars to the DOE, including PHE).
26 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950)
(noting that limiting the patent protection to the literal meaning of the claims "would place
the inventor at the mercy of verbalism ....
" and "would deprive him of the benefit of his
invention...").
27 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 575
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). By putting the public on notice of what material the patentee
disclaims, PHE enables competitors to improve on and design around patented technology
without being inhibited by the fear of lawsuits, which would try to reclaim the abandoned
material by using the DOE. Id. at 577.
See generally T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, The Doctrine of Equivalents,
and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 466-68 (2000) (discussing the generally
competitive nature of the two doctrines).
2 See ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at § 17.01 (1].
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prevent would-be copiers from making only insignificant changes to a
patented technology in order to avoid the literal meaning of the claim
verbiage, but without really doing anything substantially different.30 It
is applied when the accused technology infringes subject matter that is
not exactly the same as the patent's claimed subject matter, but is so
substantially similar as to be equivalent. 31 Under this non-literal
infringement, the courts generally use the tripartite function-way-result
test, whereby the finder of fact must determine if the accused subject
matter performs substantially the same function, in substantially the
same way, to achieve substantially the same result.3 2
PHE acts as a bar to the DOE. 33 The policy behind the DOE is to
protect the reasonable expectations of the public by precluding patentees
from recapturing material that they surrendered during prosecution in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or during a subsequent infringement
action in the courts.
Therefore, if applicants narrow the scope of a
claim by an amendment during prosecution, they are estopped from
claiming, via the DOE material, that they previously surrendered in
order to obtain the patent.35 To allow otherwise, the Supreme Court has
concluded, would allow the patentee to work a fraud upon the public. 36

Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 (discussing the problem of "piracy" by an "unscrupulous
copyist").
31See id. Literal infringement is where an accused technology is exactly the same as what is
described in the patent claims. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
30See

16.02 (1999). Non-literal infringement, or equivalency, is where the accused technology is

not exactly the same as the technology described in the patent claims, but is so substantially
similar as to be equivalent thereto. See generally id.
at § 16.02,18.04.
32 See Warner-Jenkinson Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); Penwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). Literal
infringement is where every element of the accused subject matter matches exactly the
corresponding patent claim elements. See Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Literal infringement cases are relatively rare, and such cases are often settled before
ever going to trial because of the simple nature of the determination. See Graver Tank, 339
U.S. at 607 (noting that "[o]utright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement").
The function-way-result test is the most frequently used test for
equivalency, but the Supreme Court has specifically allowed other formulations that have
been used in the past to also be used. See Warner-)enkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40 (stating that
the particular formulation of the test is not important as long as the all-elements rule is
followed).
-3See ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at § 17.07[2].
34See id.
3 See id.
36 Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259 (1879). "The allowance of claims once ,formally
abandoned by the applicant, in order to get his letters-patent through, is the occasion of
immense frauds against the public." Id. Such action by the courts would allow the
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A. Historical Development of the Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution
History Estoppel
1. The Doctrine of Equivalents
The DOE is deeply rooted in American patent law. 37 The underlying
theory seems to have first appeared in 1814 in the case of Odiorne v.
Winkley. 38 Writing for the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Judge Story laid the principal foundations for the DOE. 39 The plaintiff
owned a patent for a machine for cutting and heading nails in a single
operation. 40 The defendant used two distinct machines that performed
the same functions as the plaintiff's single machine. 41 In his instructions
to the jury on the issue of infringement, Judge Story opined that, "mere
colorable differences, or slight improvements [to an invention], cannot
shake the right of the original inventor." 42 The court's reasoning was

based on the equitable theory that the inventor of new technology is
entitled to patent protection of the full range of embodiments of the
invention, not just a particularized version, which might be suggested by
43
the patent claims.
The Supreme Court's first application of the underlying principles of

the DOE occurred in the 1822 case of Evans v. Eaton.44 In a dispute over
whether the plaintiff's patent was valid over a machine in the prior art,
the Court framed the test for equivalency between two machines as
whether the accused device operated on the same principle but merely
patentee to "procure[ ] a valuable monopoly to which he has not the slightest title." Id.
Therefore, "(u]nder such circumstances,. ..the applicant should seem to be estopped from
[such reclamation]." Id. at 260.
37See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28 (stating that "the lengthy history of the doctrine of
equivalents" strongly supports not abolishing it).
-318 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
39 Id. This case was cited by the plaintiff in error in Winans v. Deninead, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
330,337 (1854). In turn, the latter became the Supreme Court's original source for the DOE.
See Warner-enkinson, 520 U.S. at 26 n.3; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,
339 U.S. 605,608 (1950).
10See Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 581.
41See id.
42 Id.

at 582.

43See id. at 581.

Judge Story commented that "It]he original inventor of a machine is
exclusively entitled to a patent for it." Id. This opinion also anticipated the current test for
infringement under the DOE, the so-called function-way-result test. See Graver Tank, 339
U.S. at 608. Judge Story's method of determining equivalency was to determine if the
accused device produced the same effect by substantially the same mode of operation and
combination of powers. See Odiortie,18 F. Cas. at 582.
44 5 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
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differed in form, proportion, and utility. 45 In this case, the Court
adopted the principle, propounded in Odiorne, that a patentee is entitled
to patent protection for his or her invention. 46
By 1853, when the Court decided Winans v. Denmead,47 the DOE was
firmly entrenched in American patent jurisprudence. 48 However, the
closely divided Court argued about the same issues that courts and the
patent bar still debate today: whether the DOE is beneficial because it
protects an inventor's intellectual property, or whether it is detrimental
because it allows an inventor to protect more than was literally claimed
in the patent. 49 In holding that a patentee could protect against nonliteral infringement, the Court affirmed the doctrine set forth in Odiorne
and adopted by the Supreme Court in Evans.5°
The last seminal case regarding the DOE prior to Warner-Jenkinson,
was Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 51 In Graver
Tank, the Court re-affirmed the DOE and solidified the function-wayresult test for determining equivalency. 52 Again in Graver Tank, the
dissent rejected the doctrine in favor of a strict interpretation of patent
claims that would allow a patentee to show infringement only for literal
infringement.5 3 Despite the Court's repeated reaffirmation of the DOE,

-5See id. at 364.
46See supra Zimmerman, note 5, at 137.

4756 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
Is Id. The Court stated: "[l]t being a familiar rule that, to copy the principle or more of
operation described, is an infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the
original in form or proportions." Id. at 342.
49See id. at 342-47. The Court split five to four on this issue, deciding in favor of the
patentee's right to his invention. Id. at 344. These are generally the same arguments that
arise whenever the wisdom of the DOE is discussed. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 n.3 (1997). In response to the accused infringer's
argument that the DOE was inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the patentee
specifically claim the invention covered by the patent, the Court said: "Indeed, petitioner's
first argument was not new even in 1950. Nearly 100 years before Graver Tank, this Court
approved of the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v. Denmead .. " Id.
5 See supranotes 37-46 and accompanying text.
-' 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
52 See id. at 608. Under the test, a court must determine if the accused devise performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the
same result. Id. (confirming Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30,42 (1929)).
53See id.at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's dissent centered on the arguments
that the doctrine of equivalents is contrary to the principle of public notice. Id. at 614-15.
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however, judges, commentators, and the patent bar still chafe under the
equitable doctrine.5 4
2. Prosecution History Estoppel (a.k.a. File Wrapper Estoppel)55
PHE developed some time later as a check on the DOE. The estoppel
doctrine appears to have its Supreme Court roots in the 1879 case of
Leggett v. Avery.5 6 Although the issue in Leggett surrounded a reissue
application, instead of infringement under the DOE, the decision
enunciates the reasoning that became the foundation for PHE's later
application as a bar to non-literal infringement under the DOE. 57 The
Court reasoned that allowing a patentee to later claim material that he
had previously abandoned in order to obtain the patent would work a
fraud upon the public.58 The fraud of which the Court wrote would be
allowing the patentee to procure "a valuable monopoly to which he has
not the slightest title."5 9 The Court concluded that the patentee should
be estopped from claiming such matter outside the scope of the amended
60
claims.
The next year, in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 61 the Court
ruled that an accused cellulite dental plate did not infringe a patented

-1 See, e.g.,
Warner-Jettkinson, 520 U.S. at 27 n.4 (1997). The Court noted that the issues raised
in Wanier-Jenkinson were roughly the same as those raised in Graver Tank in 1950, and
Winans v. Denniead in 1854. Id.
0 See, e.g., id. at 30 (noting that PHE is the same thing as file wrapper estoppel).
101 U.S. 256 (1879).
5 See Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886) (citing to Leggett in support of estopping a
patentee from asserting non-literal infringement over technology which had been
specifically excluded by the amendment process). A reissue application is a process
whereby a patentee attempts to correct potentially fatal errors in an issued patent by
submitting the patent to the PTO for re-examination by an examiner. See generally PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 251 (1975). Therefore, because application
amendments and reissue amendments have the same effect of changing the scope and
wording of a claim, amendments under either are generally treated the same. Id.
5 See Leggett, 101 U.S. at 259. Although this statement was made in reference to a re-issue
application, the connecting similarity to PHE is the Court's recognition that a patentee is
estopped from claiming material that he was required to abandon in the first place. Id.
Interestingly, this reasoning appears to have been necessary due to poor record-keeping in
the patent office. Id. In its reasoning, the Court discussed how this rule was necessary to
prevent a patentee from gaining new material during reissue because of a change in patent
examiners where the new examiner was unaware of what transpired the during the
original prosecution. Id.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 260.
61102 U.S. 222 (1880).
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vulcanized rubber dental plate either literally or as an equivalent. 62 The
application claim had been amended during prosecution to limit the
scope from including all rubber to vulcanized rubber specifically. 63
Although the Court did not specifically mention the word "estoppel," it
clearly considered the effect of the patent's prosecution history on the
scope of the claims. 64
The limiting amendments adding the
vulcanization element notwithstanding, the Court then considered the
scope of equivalents available for the "vulcanized rubber" element. 65
Only after finding no equivalents did the Court hold no infringement. 66
Six years later, in Shepard v. Carrigan,67 the patentee held the rights to
a hem protector for dresses applied to the lower hem in order to protect
it from wear and dirt.6
The patentee claimed that the invention
consisted of a strip of fluted or plaited water-proof material.69 The
broadest claims originally consisted of the use of water-proof material in
any form to protect the lower hem of clothing from wear and dirt.70 The
62 Id. at 229.
Id. at 228.

63

Id. at 227-28. The Court apparently was not yet settled on the notion of PHE because it
began its discussion of the prosecution history by disclaiming the notion that the language
of a patent could be enlarged or diminished thereby. Id. at 227. However, in the next
sentence, the Court recognizes that the construction given to the patent can be informed by
the prosecution history. Id. The Court then proceeded to consider the effect of the
patentee's correspondence with the examiner during the application of prosecution on the
scope and meaning of the vulcanized rubber element. Id. In this case, the Court's actions
do indeed seem to speak louder than its words to show that the Court recognized that
prosecution history informs the scope and meaning of the patent claims.
M Id. at 229-30. The Court found that the accused celluloid material was not an equivalent
to vulcanized rubber because it was not formed in the same manner. Id. The discussion
clearly intimates, however, that if the accused material had been formed the same way as
vulcanized rubber, i.e., by being hardened via a heating process as opposed to a cooling
process, then the accused cellulite material would have infringed as an equivalent. See id.
66 Id. at 230.
- 116 U.S. 593 (1886).
68
See id.
69 See id. at 596. The claim in the patent read:
My invention consists in protecting the lower edge of dresses and other garments
by affixing thereto a portion of water-proofed or enameled material, or in waterproofing the material itself; and I claim as a new article of manufacture a skirt
facing or protector, having a plaited or fluted border bound with or composed of
enameled cloth or other water-proof material, substantially as and for the
purpose set forth.
Id.
7u See id. The broadest claim was not the first claim, but a substituted claim for the original
claim. Id. The original claim actually was much narrower than the first amendment, which
substituted the broad language for the narrow language of the original claim, Id. The first
amended claim read:
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Court then noted that the narrower language of the amendment, which
included the fluted or plaited requirement, had been necessary to
overcome the prior art, which included using plain strips of enameled
cloth. 71 The Court then applied the estoppel rule originally advanced in
Leggett, in conjunction with reissue applications to the current situation
of claimed, non-literal infringement 72 In rejecting the patentee's claim of
infringement, the Court held that, where a patent applicant accepts a
narrower claim than originally sought in order to obtain the patent, the
patentee cannot then enlarge the scope of the patent to cover those
elements that were explicitly abandoned by amendment when suing for
infringement. 73 The Court then applied this reasoning to the facts- at
issue by interpreting the claim strictly and found no infringement
74
because the accused hem protector was neither fluted nor plaited.
Next, in Hurlbut v. Schillinger,75 the patentee, Schillinger, originally
claimed a process of laying concrete slabs with joints by inserting tar
paper or its equivalent between successive slabs while still plastic so as
to control crack propagation and facilitate segmented repair. 76 After
adding a second, narrower claim in reissue, Schillinger specifically
disclaimed any right to exclude the formation of blocks from concrete
without interposing something between them while still plastic because
that was part of the prior art.7 The accused process involved laying
sections of concrete slab and joining them by running a trowel along the

My invention consists in protecting the lower edge of dresses and other garments
by affixing thereto a portion of water-proofed material, or in waterproofing the
material itself; and I claim as my invention the use of water-proofed material, in
whatsoever form it now exists or may hereafter exist, for the purpose of
protecting the lower edge of all garments from wear and soiling, either from
friction or moisture, and refer to the inclosed [sic] samples as substantially
representing my invention.

Id.
7' Id. at 597.

72See id. at 597-98.
7 Shepard, 116 U.S. at 598. The Court specifically linked the reasoning of Leggett as applied
to reissue proceedings to the infringement suit before it. Id.
74See id.
- 130 U.S. 456 (1889).
76Id. at 462-63. The two claims, after reissue read as follows:
1.
A concrete pavement laid in detached blocks or sections, substantially in the
manner shown and described.
2.
The arrangement of tar paper, or its equivalent, between adjoining blocks of
concrete, substantially as and for the purpose set forth.
Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
77See id.
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joint line while the concrete was still plastic.78 In deciding whether the
accused process infringed on the patented process, the Court clearly
considered whether separating the concrete with a trowel while still
plastic was equivalent to separating the concrete with tar paper while
still plastic. 79 The Court then held both patent claims to be infringed by
the accused process as equivalents. 8°
In Hubbell v. United States,81 the Court used estoppel as a strict bar to
the patentee's claim of equivalency. 82 Hubbell invented a new primer
ignition combination for metallic bullet cartridges, but was forced to
narrow his claim significantly after repeated rejections over the prior art
by the examiner. 83 The Court first acknowledged that a combination
claim could be infringed by equivalents. 84 However, the Court then
stated that claim limitations imposed by the inventor as amendments to
overcome rejections "must be strictly construed against the inventor and
in favor of the public."8 5 Although the legal conclusions drawn by the
Court appear to conflict with each other, the Court, in disposing of the
case, appears to have used PHE as a strict bar because, after finding no
literal infringement, it declined to even consider infringement by
86
equivalents.
In 1942, the Court's application of PHE established a clear process
for defining the scope of what material is estopped from the DOE in
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.87 This process consists of four
78Id. at 468.
7 See id. at 467-69. The Court, after comparing the accused process with the patented
process, concluded that the accused process was substantially the same as the patented
process. Id. at 469.
soSee id.
81179 U.S. 77 (1900).
82See id. at 83-84.
8I See id. at 79-80.
F See id. at 82. In Festo, Judge Michel based his dissenting argument on this statement.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 598 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc) (Michel, J.dissenting). As pointed out below, however, his argument seems
to omit the immediately following limitation imposed by the Court. See infra text
accompanying note 85. A "combination claim" is older terminology that is used to describe
a patent in which the invention is a novel combination of known subcombination elements
(as opposed to an invention for a previously unknown subcombination). See, e.g., M.P.E.P.
§ 806.05(a) (8th ed. 2001). Today, the PTO generally discourages the use of this terminology
because it confuses the issue of what is valid with older versions of the law. See generally id.
at § 2173.05(k).
85Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 82.
96 See id. at 86.
87 315 U.S. 126,135 (1942).
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distinct steps: first, defining the scope of the broadest proposed form of
the claim in question; second, determining whether the accused item is
encompassed by that claim; third, defining the scope of the claim as
issued; and fourth, determining whether the accused item is
encompassed by the claim as issued.88
If the accused item is
encompassed by the original claim but not the claim as issued, then the
patentee is estopped from asserting infringement under the DOE.8 9 In
applying this process, the Court utilized a strict interpretation of the
claim's amended language with regard to what the inventor had actually
disclaimed, not allowing any equivalents within the zone of explicitly
abandoned material. 90
B. The Warner-Jenkinson Decision
The Supreme Court last revisited the DOE and PHE in WarnerJenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.91 Warner-Jenkinson was decided
mainly to eradicate some misconceptions in the patent field that the 1952
amendments to the Patent Act had somehow eliminated the DOE.92 The
Court also established that equivalency must be decided on an elementby-element analysis as opposed to looking at the invention as a whole. 93
The underlying dispute was whether Warner-Jenkinson had infringed
Hilton Davis' patented method for purifying dye "at a pH from
"

See id. The Court does not lay out the steps this distinctly in its opinion. Id.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the Court's application shows that this is what the Court
actually did. See id. at 136 (stating that "[b]y the amendment he recognized and
emphasized the difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of
all that is embraced in that difference").
89See id. at 136-37.
0 See id. at 137. The Court stated:
The difference which he thus disclaimed must be regarded as material, and since
the amendment operates as a disclaimer of that difference it must be strictly
construed against him ....[W]hat the patentee, by a strict construction of the
claim, has disclaimed - [description] - cannot now be regained by recourse to the
doctrine of equivalents, which at most operates, by liberal construction, to secure
to the inventor the full benefits, not disclaimed, of the claims allowed.
Id.
- 520 U.S. 17 (1997).

92See id. at 25-27. In the introductory remarks, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous
court, stated that the Court granted certiorari in order to clarify the proper scope of the
DOE. See id. at 21.
9 See id. at 29. The Court found this to be particularly important so as to prevent the
application of the DOE from vitiating the central function of the patent claims themselves.
Id. at 30. In other words, if important nuances in the prior art are avoided by particular
elements of the claim, the patentee should not be able to gloss over those nuances during
litigation by having the jury consider the patent as a whole without considering the fine
nuances and reasons for each element of the claim. Id.
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approximately 6.0 to 9.0. ,94 The pH range was not in the claim as
originally filed but was added to overcome a rejection over the prior art
that disclosed such a process above a pH of 9.0.95 There was no reason in
the record for the addition of the lower pH limit of 6.0.96
After holding that the DOE was still good law, the Court went on to
discuss the application of PHE.97 The Court rejected the petitioner's
proposed rule that any limiting amendments made during prosecution,
regardless of the reason, preclude recapture of that part later under the
DOE.98 Instead, the Court insisted that the reason for an amendment is
always relevant to determining what, if any, material the applicant has
abandoned to the public. 99 Therefore, the Court concluded, a limiting
amendment that was not included to avoid the prior art does not
necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents. 00
Rejecting the petitioner's proposed bright line rule, the Court next
addressed what a court should do when faced with an amendment for
which the file does not give any reason. 101 In order to overcome that
obstacle, the Court created a rebuttable presumption of patentability for
any unexplained amendment.102 Thereby, if the patent holder does not
present any contrary reason for an amendment, courts should presume
that the patent holder had a "substantial reason related to patentability"
for the limiting language. 103 Under such circumstances, the Court added,
"prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine
of equivalents as to that element." 1 4
C. Two Lines of Authority in the Federal Circuit Regarding the ProperScope of
Equivalents for Claims Subject to Estoppel
It is generally accepted that, from 1984 until the recent Festo decision,
there were two divergent lines of authority regarding the proper scope

91See id. at 21-22.
See id. at 22.
96See id.
9 See Wamer-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,30-34 (1997).
18See id. at 30. "(Pletitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment
during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel." Id.
99See id. at 32.
100
See id. at 33.
10 See id. at 33-34.
102See id. at 33.
103 Wamer-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,33 (1997).
104Id.
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of equivalents for claims subject to PHE.105 One line followed the Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ("Hughes I") decision, which applied a flexible
bar approach to PHEY° 6 Under this approach, where PHE applied to a
claim element, the court applied a sliding scale whereby, "[d]epending
on the nature and purpose of an amendment, [prosecution history
estoppel] may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from
great to small to zero .... It is not fatal to application of the doctrine [of
equivalents] itself." 1°7 The other line followed the Kinzenbaw v. Deere &
Co. decision, which applied a strict bar approach to PHE. 3 8 Under this
approach, when the patentee gave no convincing reason for the court to
enlarge the literal scope of the claim, which was narrowed by
amendment in order to avoid the prior art, the court refused to consider
equivalents to the estopped claim element. 109 Although the court
subsequently followed the flexible bar approach of Hughes I most
frequently, it never explicitly rejected or reconciled the two lines of
authority. 10o Therefore, until the en banc decision in Festo, which dealt
with these competing lines of authority, a patentee or competitor could

10s See, e.g., Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 921 (1989) (noting the apparent conflict between
the two lines of authority); Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Area Summary, Patent Law
Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 861, 887-88 (1987) (discussing the two divergent lines of authority regarding the
proper scope of PHE). Professor Chisum commented that:
shortly after its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit developed two
lines of authority on the scope of an estoppel based on an amendment
or argument that distinguished the prior art. One line followed a strict
approach, according to which a court refused to speculate whether a
narrower amendment would have been allowed. The other line
followed a flexible or spectrum approach, which recognized that
amendments did not invariably preclude all equivalence.
CHISUM, supra note 31, § 18.05[3][b] at 18-492. In its decision, the Festo majority opinion
cites to all of these commentators to support its conclusion that an irreconcilable conflict of
authority exists within the Federal Circuit's own decisions. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 573-74 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). Bnt see
id. at 634-35 (Newman, J., dissenting) (proposing that the two lines are not actually in
conflict, but merely rulings on either end of a continuum of situations from those where a
strict bar was appropriate to those where an extremely flexible bar was appropriate).
10 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
W7 Id. at 1363.
109 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10
Id. at 389.
1

0 CHISUM, supra note 31, § 18.05(3)(b)(i). "Most Federal Circuit panel decisions from 1984
to 1997 followed the flexible approach, which had been initiated in 1983 by the Hughes
Aircraft decision .... " Id.; see also Festo, 234 F.3d at 574 (stating, "this court has neither
repudiated Kinzenbaw nor reconciled the inconsistency between the Hughes I and Kinzenbaw
lines of authority").
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not predict with certainty which line of authority any given Federal
Circuit panel would follow in any given case."1
D. The Festo Decision
The confusion caused by these two decisions came to a head in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd." 2 Festo involved a suit
for infringement on two patents relating to magnetically coupled rodless
cylinders: the Carroll patent and the Stoll patent. 1 3 Following the
Supreme Court's grant, vacate, and remand order, a Federal Circuit
panel applied the Warner-Jenkinson presumption to both patents."4 In
regard to the Carroll patent, the court concluded that a voluntary
amendment that was not relevant to patentability, and for which the
applicant gave no reasons, does not necessarily generate an estoppel." 5
Therefore, the court found no reversible error in the previous ruling." 6
In regard to the Stoll patent, the court affirmed the prior ruling as to one
amended element, but remanded for further fact finding regarding the
reasons for another amended element." 7 In its reasoning, the court
emphasized the distinction between a "required" amendment and a
"voluntary" amendment." 8 The court reasoned that the WarnerJenkinson presumption was aimed strictly towards those amendments
required by the examiner during prosecution." 9 Therefore, the court
concluded that Warner-Jenkinson allowed it to determine the scope of a
voluntary amendment not required to overcome the prior art. 20

1I Festo, 234 F.3d at 574. "Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether in any given
case the court will apply the Kinzenbaw approach as opposed to the more generally
accepted Hughes I approach." Id.
11272 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub. ioin., Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
Ltd. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111 (1997) (remanding to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson),on remand, 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated
and withdrawvn by, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (granting petition for rehearing en banc), on
rehearing en banc, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and certiorari granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
113See Festo, 72 F.3d at 860.
11

See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1364.

115See id. at 1374.
116Id.
117See id. at 1378-81.

The court affirmed the decision on the element regarding the
magnetizable material for the outer sleeve. See id. at 1380. The court remanded the
decision on the element regarding the sealing rings. See id.
11 See id. at 1379-80.
119Id.

12 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1361, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Four months after the Festo decision, on remand, the Federal Circuit
granted Shoketsu's petition for an en banc rehearing and withdrew the
previous decision.12' In the order for rehearing, the court presented five
questions to which the parties and amici curiae could respond.'2
In a potentially landmark decision, the Federal Circuit answered the
first four questions as follows. 2 3 In response to its first question, the
court held that, "a substantial reason related to patentability" is not
limited to overcoming or avoiding prior art but instead includes any
reason which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.
Therefore, a narrowing amendment made for any reason related to the
statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to PHE with respect to
the amended claim element. 2 4 In response to its second question, the
court held that, voluntary claim amendments are treated the same as
other claim amendments. "Therefore, a voluntary amendment that

narrows the scope of a claim for a reason related to the statutory
requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel as
to the amended claim element." 125 In answer to its third question, the
121Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.

1999).
22
See id. at 1381-82. The five questions presented by the court were:
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim creates
prosecution history estoppel, is "a substantial reason related to patentability,"
Warner-Jenkinson, limited to those amendments made to overcome the prior art
under §§ 102 and 103, or does "patentability" mean any reason affecting the
issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a "voluntary" claim amendment - one not
required by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an examiner for a
stated reason - create prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under WarnerJenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of
equivalents for the claim element so amended?
4. When "no explanation (for a claim amendment] is established," WarnerJenkinson, thus invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under
Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the
doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warner-Jenkinson's
requirement that the application of the doctrine of equivalents "is not allowed
such broad play as to eliminate [an] element in its entirety." [Warner-Jenkinson].
In other words, would such a judgment of infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson,
violate the "all elements" rule?
Id.
(full citations omitted).
121 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc). The court did not answer the fifth question because the nature of its
holdings to the first four obviated any need to answer the fifth. See id. at 578.
124Id. at 566.
123Id. at 568.
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court held that "[w]hen a claim amendment creates prosecution history
estoppel with no regard to an element of a claim, there is no range of
equivalents available for the amended claim element." 126 Finally, in
answer to its fourth question, the court held that, "'unexplained'
amendments are not entitled to any range of equivalents." 127
III. ANALYSIS

In its decision to make PHE a strict bar to the DOE, the Festo majority
went to great length to justify its reversal of eighteen years of
precedent.'2 The court used a three-step analysis to reach the new
ruling. 129 First, the court reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions from
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite'30 through Warner-Jenkinson'3' to ascertain
whether the Court had ever addressed the issue of what scope of
equivalents is available for an explained amendment that gives rise to
PHE.132 The court concluded that "none of the [Supreme Court]
language . . . constitutes explicit and carefully considered language
regarding the range of equivalents available when a claim amendment
gives rise to prosecution history estoppel." 133 Therefore, the court found
that it had the power to independently decide the issue. 3 4 Next, the

court reviewed its own precedent from Hughes 135 through Hughes 11.13 6
2

1Id.at 569.
Id. at 564.
2 Id. at 572. Since 1983, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court following their lead,
has established and followed a flexible bar approach to equivalents affected by PHE. See
supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
129 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu. Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 569-77
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
1- 102 U.S. 222 (1880); see also supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Goodyear).
-1520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussing WarnerJenkinson).
132See Festo, 234 F.3d at 569-71. The court discussed the following cases: Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315
U.S. 126 (1942); Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931); Weber Elec. Co. v. E.H.
Freeman Elec. Co., 256 U.S. 668 (1921); Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456 (1889); Goodyear
Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222 (1880). Id. The court also considered the
following cases cited by Judge Michel and dismissed them as not bearing upon the issue:
Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 (1900); Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524 (1892); Phoenix Caster
Co. v. Spiegel, 133 U.S. 360 (1890); Artificial Stone-PavingCo. v. Schalicke, 119 U.S. 401 (1886);
Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U.S. 530 (1886); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886); Fay v.
Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408 (1883). Id.
13 Id. at 571.
14 Id.
15 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also supranotes
106-07 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
'2
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The court discussed its two apparently divergent lines of cases: the
Hughes I line, which represented the flexible bar approach, and the
Kinzenbaw line, which represented the strict bar approach. 137 The court
concluded that the two lines of cases were at odds with each other, that
the courts had never reconciled the inconsistency between the two, and
that the result was uncertainty and unpredictability in the law. 38

Finally, after deducing that a problem existed, the court pronounced
the new law and set forth its reasoning. 139 The court found that the state
of the law at that time was "unworkable" due to the difficulty in
predicting the scope of patent protection with any degree of certainty
under the flexible bar approach to PHE.14 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied on three policy objectives: first, giving effect to an
applicant's disclaimer; second, preserving the notice function of claims;
1 41
and third, promoting certainty in the patent law.
The disclaimer policy objective comes from the long history of
preventing a patentee from reclaiming under the DOE that which he has
expressly disclaimed during patent prosecution.142 The court reasoned
that the Hubbel decision directly supported applying a strict bar because
of the Supreme Court's statement that a limiting amendment "must be
strictly construed against the inventor and in favor of the public, and
looked upon as in the nature of disclaimers." 143 Admitting that the late
nineteenth century Supreme Court cases did not speak directly to the

"-, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Festo, 234
F.3d at 571-74.
137 Festo, 234 F.3d at 571-74. Under the flexible bar approach, PHE acts as a flexible bar
where the scope of equivalents allowed must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and
the estoppel can range from absolute to almost none. See supra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text; see also Modine Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Service Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
LaBounty Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under
the strict bar approach, PHE acts as an absolute bar to all equivalents, thereby eliminating
the need for a case-by-case determination. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.

1-18
See Festo, 234 F.3d at 574.
IN See id. at 574-78.
140 See id. at 574-75.
141 See

id. at 575-78.
Id. at 575-76. The court cites this doctrine as having its roots in Shepard v. Carrigan,116
U.S. 593, 598 (1886). Id.; see also supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing
Shepard). This is also known as the doctrine of recapture. See Chandler, supranote 28, at
515-19 (discussing the origins of prosecution history from the doctrine of recapture through
Shepard v. Carriganand Leggett v. Avery).
143 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 576 (quoting Hubbel v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1900)).
142
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issue, the court found that the cases suggested that the Supreme Court
44
intended a strict use of estoppel on limiting amendments.
Turning next to the notice function of patent claims, the court stated
its underlying reason for supporting the strict bar: the benefit to the
public from having notice of the exact boundaries outweighed the
145
expense to the inventor of possibly losing some part of his invention.
146
This policy judgment is the true essence of the public notice objective.
The court cited the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson presumption to
support its judgment, reasoning that the strict application of PHE gives
proper deference to the public notice function of claims.' 47 However,
none of the language cited by the court requires the policy decision it
made.148
Finally, the court turned to the certainty argument and found that it
was virtually impossible to ascertain the exact range of equivalents
under the flexible bar approach. 14 9 Apparently accepting the assumption
that computer-like certainty of results is preferable to equitable wiggle
room, the court propounded the theory that a complete bar will bring
certainty to both the public and inventor alike by clearly defining the

144Id.

("Although we do not understand older Supreme Court cases to have spoken
directly to the question before us, we think the language used in those cases suggesting a
strict measurement of the scope of equivalents is consistent with our answer to this
question [of appropriate scope].").
145 Id. ("Allowing some range of equivalents gives the patentee some benefit of the doubt
as to what was disclaimed, a benefit that comes at the public's expense. A complete bar
therefore best serves the notice and definitional function of patent claims."). From this
language and the court's conclusion, it is clearly evident that the court has judged that the
public interests outweigh the private interests. Id.
146 See, e.g., Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 US. 17, 29, 33 (1997)
(discussing the conflict between public notice and inventors' rights); Sweeney & Bush,
supra note 25, at 151 (discussing the public notice function and PHE).
47 Festo, 234 F.3d at 576. The court reasoned that since the Supreme Court felt that a
complete bar for unexplained amendments would give the proper deference to the role of
claims in providing public notice, then a complete bar would do the same for all limiting
amendments. Id.
11 See id. Although the court pointed to language in McClain v. Ortinayer, 141 U.S. 419
(1891), and Warner-jenkinson to support its policy judgment, the language cited merely fails
to forbid such a result. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29; McClain, 141 U.S. at 424).
None of the language cited by the court compels the outcome that the Federal Circuits
reached in weighing the competing policies. See id.
149Id. at 577. "Under the flexible bar approach, however, the exact range of equivalents
when prosecution history estoppel applies is virtually unascertainable, with only the prior
art marking the outer limits of the claim's scope." Id.
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-outer boundaries of amended claims. 50 Thus, the court concluded, such
certainty will stimulate investment and activity in design-arounds
because the risk of infringement will be easier to determine.' 5' The court
ended its reasoning by asserting that it saw no overriding benefit to
keeping the flexible bar approach since it did not believe that the benefit
2
to the inventor outweighed the cost of uncertainty to the public.15
A. The Festo Holding Goes Too Far by Effectively Eviscerating the Supreme
Court'sWarner-Jenkinson Ruling
The analysis for infringement under the new Festo ruling completely
changes the analysis for infringement under the DOE by significantly
and disproportionately strengthening the PHE bar defense.15 3 Under the
new Festo analysis for infringement by equivalents, the first inquiry is
whether the claim elements in question have been amended to narrow
their literal scope. 15 4 If not, then the analysis proceeds under the
150Id.

"A complete bar, unlike a flexible bar, thus lends certainty to the process of
determining the scope of protection afforded by a patent." Id.
151 Id. The court seems to herald the advent of a great new age when the previously hazy
borders of technological advances will now be clearly within the public domain, and bold
competitors will no longer need to attempt to market valuable design-arounds and fear
legal reprisals from unscrupulous patentees trying to hoard more than their ought due. See
id. Although not stated in such specific terms, the court basically justifies its policy on the
assumption that patent counsel will now be able to provide their design-around clients
with crystal-clear infringement opinions with a greatly reduced risk of committing
malpractice for incorrect prediction of how a court will rule on the equitable decision. See
id. at 577-78.
152 Id. at 578.
153 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabishiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 587-89 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (providing a clear example of the new analysis structure as applied by
the court to the Stoll patent); see also ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Tech. Corp., 125
F. Supp. 2d 391, 393-400 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the application of PHE both prior to
and after the Festo decision).
15 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v? Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir.2001); see
also Biovail Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The court does limit its scope of
amendments that give rise to estoppel to those that narrow the claim's scope as opposed to
amendments that enlarge the claim's scope. Festo, 234 F.3d. at 566. Although the court
does not add the narrowing limitation into its stated holding for question one, the next
sentence includes the limitation: "Therefore, a narrowing amendment .. " Id. (emphasis
added). In addition, the court stated in its analysis of the patent claims at issue that the
first step was to determine whether the amendment narrowed the literal scope of the claim.
Id. at 587. Since the nature of PHE is to prevent a patentee from reclaiming subject matter
that he has previously surrendered, it is only logical that the estoppel can only operate
where an amendment narrows the scope of the claim and not where it enlarges the scope.
Id. Further, Judge Linn's concurring opinion states that the majority opinion is "very clear"
that the new PHE rule only applies to a narrowing amendment. Id. at 622 (Linn and Rader,
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traditional function-way-result and all-elements analysis of Graver
Tank.155 If, however, the answer is yes, then the second question is
whether the amendment was made for reasons of patentability.1 56 Under
Festo, a reason for patentability includes amendments made for any
reason which relate to the statutory requirements, not just amendments
made to overcome the prior art.1 57 Therefore, amendments made to meet
any of the relevant United States Code provisions are subject to PHE. 15
Of course, an unexplained limiting amendment still gives rise to PHE. 15 9
If the court determines that a limiting amendment was made for any one
of these reasons, then that claim element is subject to PHE under the
holding of question one in Festo.160 Finally, under the holding of
question three in Festo, a claim element that is subject to PHE can have
no range of equivalents.' 6' In other words, PHE acts as a complete bar to
any use of the DOE for that claim element, and the patentee is limited to
62
preventing only literal infringement of that element.

JJ., concurring). From the court's subsequent holdings, it is obviously necessary that the

amendment has narrowed the literal scope of the claim element for PHE to even be
considered. See, e.g., Biovail, 239 F.3d at 1303; Litton Sys., 238 F.3d at 1380; Pioneer Magnetics,
238 F.3d at 1344-45.
10 See ACLARA, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 398. ("If some of the relevant limitations were not
amended, the patentee may assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for those
unaltered limitations."). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
Graver Tank function-way-result test for equivalence).
156 See Pioneer Magnetics, 238 F.3d at 1344-45 ("A court next must examine the reason why
an applicant amended a claim . .

.

. If the reason for the amendment is related to

patentability, no equivalency is available as to the subject matter of the amendment.").
15 Festo, 234 F.3d at 566.
15 Id. Section 101 deals with what type of material is patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
Section 102 defines the novelty requirements and statutory bars for patentability. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1994). Section 103 deals with the non-obviousness requirement for patentability. 35
U.S.C. §103 (1994). Section 112 deals with the formal requirements of the specification and
claims. 35 U.S.C § 112 (1994). Section 112, paragraph 1, includes the written description
requirement, the enablement requirement, and the best mode requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 112,
para. 1. Section 112, paragraph 2 deals with the particularity and distinctness requirements
for
claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2.
15 9 See Biovail, 239 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Festo, 234 F.3d at 576).
160
Festo, 234 F.3d at 566 (stating that a narrowing amendment made for any reason related
to the statutory requirements will give rise to PHE for that element).
161 Id. at 569; see also Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d. 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that under the complete bar rule of Festo, a patentee is estopped from claiming
any equivalents to the estopped subject matter); Pioneer Magnetics, 238 F.3d at 1345 (stating
that if prosecution history applies, then "no equivalency is available as to the subject matter
of the amendment").
162 Festo, 234 F.3d at 566; see also Biovail, 239 F.3d at 1304 ("[W]hen application of the
doctrine of equivalents to a limitation is completely barred due to prosecution history
estoppel, a patentee asserting infringement must show by a preponderance of the evidence
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By making PHE a complete bar to equivalents, this ruling goes well
63
beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson decision.1
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court clearly accepted the Federal Circuit's
flexible bar approach advanced in Hughes I, by noting that the Patent and
Trademark Office had been requesting amendments with the expectation
that the new language could allow for a range of equivalents. 164 Under
this approach, a court had to determine what subject matter was
dedicated to the public and what was retained by the patentee on a caseby-case basis. 165
Although the Supreme Court introduced a new,
rebuttable presumption that eliminated all equivalents for unexplained
narrowing amendments made for reasons related to patentability, it did
not, and had no intention of, holding that all estoppel eliminated all
equivalents for all claim elements affected by PHE. 16 In fact, the Court
explicitly rejected such a "wooden" application of estoppel, which was
advanced by Warner-Jenkinson.167 This difference is the essence of the
dramatic expansion of the power of PHE that the Festo dissenters so

that an allegedly infringing device literally reads on that limitation as properly
construed."). One district court has already found a distinguishing feature to this rule,
which is subject to interpretation. See ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Tech. Corp., 125
F. Supp. 2d 391, 399-403 (D.Cal. 2000). This district court was able to evade the absolute
effect of PHE by narrowly defining the claim "limitation." Id. at 401-03. Essentially, the
court looked beyond the plain text of the claim language and considered the underlying
functions of the amendments in parsing out what limitations were actually estopped from
excluding equivalents. Id. at 402.
163The Warner-Jenkinson decision was meant mostly to reaffirm the viability of the doctrine
of equivalents. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Although the Court also
introduced the new presumption regarding unexplained amendments, it also reaffirmed
that PHE and the DOE are equitable doctrines that should not be "woodenly" applied by
the courts. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. Therefore, by the Festo majority's
own admission, this decision goes beyond anything the Supreme Court has said regarding
this issue. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 569-70.
164 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,32 (1997). The Court also
stated that, "[t]o change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well subvert
the various balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which
have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision." Id.at 32 n.6.
165 Generally, the court had to determine the scope of both the original claim and the
amended claim, examine the dialog between the applicant and the examiner, and then
decide what subject matter had been disclaimed by the applicant in order to receive the
patent. See generally supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
prosecution history estoppel prior to Festo).
166 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-33.
The defendant had proposed that any
amendment, regardless of the reason or effect on scope, should give rise to an absolute
estoppel bar to equivalents. Id. However, in flatly rejecting such an idea without much
discussion, it is apparent that the Court did not believe that such a powerful bar to
equivalents is the correct approach to reigning in the DOE. See id.
167See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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vigorously opposed. 68 Therefore, the Supreme Court's handling of the
appeal could be most informative on this issue.
The essence of the Warner-Jenkinson ruling contained five basic
holdings.
First, the DOE is still a valid method of finding
infringement. 169 Second, some limiting claim amendments raise PHE
and some do not, depending on why the limitation was added. 170 Third,
where a limiting amendment was made for reasons other than avoiding
the prior art, it may or may not preclude the protection of equivalents. 17
Fourth, where a limiting amendment is made for a substantial reason
related to patentability, PHE precludes protection for equivalents.' 72
Fifth, where there is no reason proffered for a limiting amendment, the
courts should assume that the amendment was made for a substantial
reason related to patentability and apply a strict bar to claiming
protection for equivalents. 173
These conclusions, on the face of the Warner-Jenkinson decision, leave
open at least two questions regarding the scope of equivalents available
when there is PHE. First, where the limiting amendment is related to
avoiding the prior art, does PHE act as a strict bar to all equivalents?
Second, where the limiting amendment is not related to avoiding the
prior art, what reasons allow the patentee to claim equivalents, i.e., what
does, or does not, constitute a "substantial reason related to
16 See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 633-34 (Neuman, J., dissenting). "The (Supreme] Court's

emphasis on a 'limited set of reasons' is in striking contrast to the unconstrained estoppel
established by the majority .... In Warner-]enkinson the Court unequivocally rejected this
position .... The majority adopts the brighter line that the Court rejected." Id.
16 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21 (declining to "speak the death" of the DOE).
7 See id. at 32 (stating that "[o]ur prior cases have consistently applied prosecution history
estoppel only where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons, and we see no
substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the
reasons for a change").
'71 See id. at 33. This conclusion is logically derived from the statement made by the Court
that "[w]here the reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the
change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude infringement by
equivalents of that element." Id. In other words, where the added claim limitation was not
made to overcome the prior art, it may or may not preclude infringement by equivalents.
172Id. In creating the new presumption, the Court held that "[w]here no explanation is
established, however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial
reason related to patentability... [under which circumstances] prosecution history
estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element." Id.
Therefore, although the Court was speaking specifically about the situation where the
reason for an amendment is unknown, the logic extends that the bar is equally applicable
where the presumption is found to be valid from the prosecution history.
173See id. This is merely the essence of the Warner-Jenkinson presumption. Id.
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patentability?" 174 In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to
both look beyond the plain text of Warner-Jenkinson and consult previous
Supreme Court decisions.
The answer to the first question is found both implicitly within the
text of Warner-Jenkinson itself and also in the Court's prior decisions.
Reading between the lines of Warner-Jenkinson, one must conclude that
amending a claim to avoid the prior art acts as a strict bar. Avoiding the
prior art is unquestionably the most substantial reason for limiting any
patent claim. 175 The fourth holding evidences that a limiting amendment
made for substantial reasons related to patentability creates a strict bar to
the use of the DOE. 176 Therefore, a limiting amendment made for the
purpose of avoiding the prior art must necessarily also create a strict bar
to finding equivalents. Looking at prior decisions, one must also come to
the same conclusion. In Hubbel, the Court clearly applied a strict bar to
equivalents for a limiting amendment made to overcome a rejection over
the prior art.17 Similarly, in Shepard, the Court construed an amendment
made to overcome the prior art strictly, effectively applying PHE as a
strict bar to equivalents. 178 Therefore, the logical conclusion reached
from the Warner-Jenkinson decision is also supported by prior Supreme
Court decisions.
Although this conclusion supports part of the Festo holding, it does
not instruct the Federal Circuit regarding either what scope of
equivalents should be allowed for amendments that were not made for
substantial reasons related to patentability, or what constitutes nonsubstantial reason. Instead, the Federal Ciruit forges its own new path
into unchartered legal regions by holding that a substantial reason
related to patentability includes Sections 101 and 112 issues as well as
Section 102 and Section 103 issues. 179 In deciding to define Section 101

174See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
175The statutory authority to confer patents extends only to "new" technology. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994). Therefore, a technology is not patentable if it has been "known or used by
others [i.e. not the patent applicant] ... before the invention thereof by the applicant .. "
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). This is a logical extension of the constitutional authority which
allows Congress to confer patents only for "Discoveries." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
Thus, if a technology is not new (i.e. it is part of the "prior art"), it logically follows that it
really is not a "discovery" in the constitutional sense.
176See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
177See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing Hubbel).
17
8 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing Sheppard).
179 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 566-68
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). The majority opinion comes to the same conclusion: that the
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and Section 112 issues as substantial reasons, the court has substantially
expanded and strengthened PHE as a limit to the DOE.180 The court
justified this bold step simply by stating that it saw no reason why PHE
should not arise from amendments made for these reasons, and it again
concluded that the notice function outweighs the patentee's rights. 181
Each of the five individual holdings made by the court is arguably
well-founded in itselfJf82 However, the aggregate effect of these holdings
dramatically shifts the delicate balance established between protecting
the inventor's rights through the DOE and protecting the public's
interest in clear and certain notification with PHE.183 Under the new
system, the Festo court has clearly shifted the balance in favor of the
public's interests over the private patentee's rights. 18 Contrary to the
court's offhand statements otherwise, there are good reasons for not
shifting the balance so unfavorably against the patentee's interests by
creating a legalistic, bright line rule merely for the sake of simplifying
adjudication of tough questions, such as where the exact location of a
patentee's property lines are in specific situations. 18a Furthermore, the
Festo decision appears to run contrary to the general attitude of the
86
Supreme Court toward the interplay between the DOE and PHE.1

Supreme Court's previous decisions did not instruct the court as to this issue. Id. at 567.
See supra note 158 (explaining Sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of the U.S. Code).
concurring).
190
See generally Festo, 234 F.3d at 633-34 (Newman, J.,
181See id. at 567.
182See, e.g., supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (arguing the precedential support for
a strict bar interpretation of prosecution history estoppel). See also infra notes 283-85 and
accompanying text (proposing that PHE should only be a strict bar to art that was actually
considered by the PTO). But see infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text (arguing that
Section 112 amendments are not "substantial" amendments related to patentability).
183See Festo, 234 F.3d at 620-21 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
18s See supra text accompanying note 180 (explaining that the court saw no good reason for
not changing the law). The fact that four judges dissented in four different opinions seems
to contradict the majority's conclusion that there are no good reasons not to implement the
strict bar. See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 598 (Michel & Rader, JJ., dissenting on the strict bar
rule); id. at 619 (Rader, J., dissenting on the strict bar rule); id. at 620 (Linn & Rader, JJ.,
dissenting on both the substantial
dissenting on the strict bar rule); id. at 630 (Newman, J.,
reasons rule and the strict bar rule).
186 See, e.g., supra notes 93, 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
Warner-Jenkinson decision). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected using "bright line" rules
merely for the sake of predictive certainty. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 (1997). Where the Court did create a bright line rule - the WarnerJenkinson presumption - it was merely a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar to
equivalents. Id. Although the Court did acknowledge that the DOE seemed to have taken
on "a life of its own," the Court also refused to "speak the death" of the DOE. Id.
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Perhaps the strongest argument against the complete bar approach
to PHE is the "Equitable Argument." 8 7 This argument generally relies
on the basic premise that the DOE is an equitable doctrine promulgated
by judges in order to protect the interests of the inventor against the
"unscrupulous copyist" who is merely making insubstantial changes to
the inventor's property. 8H Similarly, PHE is an equitable doctrine
promulgated to protect the interests of an "innocent," near-infringer
from an unscrupulous patentee who tries to reclaim subject matter that
he has expressly disclaimed and upon which the near-infringer should
be able to reasonably rely. 8 9 When both situations arise in a particular
case, the courts must necessarily look to the facts of that case to
determine a fair and just outcome particular to that specific set of

circumstances. 190

Because these are equitable doctrines, the courts

should not try to make algorithmic legal formulas just to facilitate ease of
predictability. 191 To the contrary, the courts and judges are peculiarly
well suited for performing just such an equitable balancing approach. 192
Therefore, the mere fact that the outcome of such an equitable
determination is not absolutely predictable is not a good enough reason
to justify abandoning the equitable nature of the DOE and PHE in favor
193
of a legalistic formula.

Therefore, it seems apparent that even the current Supreme Court supports the equitable
balancing that courts must apply between the DOE and its counterpart, PHE.
187See Festo, 234 F.3d at 617 (Michel, J., dissenting).
18RSee, e.g., id. at 617 (stating that "protection against such 'close copying' is the central
office of the doctrine of equivalents"); see also Chandler, supra note 28, at 467 (discussing
near copyists).
189See Festo, 234 F3d. at 617 (Michel, J., dissenting).
190See id. "By its very purpose, equity jurisprudence provides a remedy individually
tailored to the circumstances of the dispute at hand." Id.
'9' See generally id. at 622-25 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
But see
Michel, supra note 25, at 139-40 (proposing that litigation avoidance, case settlement, and
the ability of patent counsel to write reliable opinion letters about potential infringement all
require "outcome predictability," which is not possible under the formulation of the DOE).
'9 See Festo, 234 F.3d. at 617 (Michel, J., dissenting). The dissent states:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims.
Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).
19. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997). There, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected this type of argument:
That petitioner's rule might provide a brighter line for determining whether a
patentee is estopped under certain circumstances is not a sufficient reason for
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A close, policy-based corollary to the equitable argument is that, in
weighing the equities of any given case, the patentee's right to his
invention should outweigh the public's right to clear notice.194 When
one strips away the myriad of legal layers and looks at the bare essence
of the patent quid pro quo, the public is receiving the better part of the
bargain in the end, no matter how clear the claim language. 195 The
public receives the inventor's entire knowledge regarding his invention
from the issue date unto eternity. 196 In return, the inventor receives only
a limited time to capitalize on his idea before his rights are effectively
eviscerated by public disclosure.997 Furthermore, the patentee assumes
all of the business risks associated with developing markets for the new
technology. 198 If there is no demand for the technology, only the
patentee has lost money in trying to bring his invention to the
marketplace. 99 On the other hand, the public assumes none of those
risks. 200 If, after the patent term expires, the idea has been unprofitable,
the public has not lost one cent.20' However, if the idea is profitable,
then the public is free to copy and capitalize on it without restriction

adopting such a rule. This is especially true where, as here, the PTO may have
relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a change
in the first place. To change so substantially the rules of the game now could
very well subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the
numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by
our decision.
Id.
19 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3 (arguing for strong protection of patentees' intellectual
property rights).
195 See, e.g., David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical Linkages and
InplicationsforGlobal Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 261,
264-66 (1991) (discussing the Schumpeterian growth model); see also infra notes 196-97 and
accompanying text.
1%Once the inventor's knowledge regarding his invention is published in the issued patent,
that knowledge is part of the public domain. That was the whole purpose of giving
Congress the constitutional power to confer letters of patent to inventors. See supra notes 12 and accompanying text.
197 Under the current law, other than some minor extensions to account for excessive
procedural delays, most patents are only good for twenty years from the date of
application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). Design patents are only good for fourteen years
from the date of issue. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).
198See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 627 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting) (concluding that the new strict application of
estoppel will be a disincentive for inventors to bear the commercial risk in developing new
technology).
19 9 Id. at 640 (Newman, J., dissenting).
2

Id.

2ml Id.
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after the patent expires. 202 In such a one-sided bargain, it seems that
equity and good faith should require the public to uphold its end of the
patent contract by zealously protecting the inventor's rights during the
patent period. 20 3 The inventor did not have to inform the public about
his invention in the first place, but he was induced to do so by the
promise of limited monopoly rights. 2 4 Because the public receives a
more significant benefit in the end, in accordance with justice, the public
must be required to honor its contractual obligation generously, instead
of begrudgingly.
Another argument against the complete bar approach is centered on
the economic analysis of the need for certainty versus the need to protect
the inventor. 205 The ultimate issue for the certainty argument is that a
broad interpretation of the DOE makes it hard to predict whether a
competitor will be adjudged to infringe when he is skirting at the edges
of patented subject matter. 2 6 The conclusion drawn is that such
uncertainty will inhibit the progress of the useful arts by chilling
potential design-around solutions. 20 7 This argument is flawed for at least
two reasons. First, it does not appear that a liberal construction of the
DOE in favor of protecting the patentee's rights has ever inhibited the
progression of technology in the marketplace. 2 8 In fact, the opposite
appears more likely because, from 1983 until the present - the time

m2Id.
2w See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 518-24.
2 Id.

205See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kogyo Habushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 618-19 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Michel, J., dissenting); id. at 638-41 (Newman, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. 520 U.S. 17,28-29 (1997). "We
do, however, share the concern of the dissenters below that the doctrine of equivalents, as it
has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the
patent claims." Id.
2 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Com plex Economics of PatentScope,
90 CoLO. L. REv. 839, 886 (1990) (discussing the negative effects of broad patent scopes on
emergent technologies); see also Festo, 234 F.3d at 597 (Lourie, J., concurring). In justifying
the strict bar approach, Judge Lourie stated:
In today's world, the specter of unpredictable equivalence claims haunts too
many business decisions .... It is more than justified to lessen this fear and hold
patent applicants to the consequences of their public prosecution decisions. The
rule we announce today should encourage innovation, lessen uncertainty, and
diminish the volume of unnecessary litigation ....
Festo, 234 F.3d at 597 (Lourie, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Doctrine of Equivalents: An Economic Analysis of
Patent Scope, in 3 INT'L PERSP. INTELL. PROP. 74, 77 (1997) (arguing that broad interpretation
of the DOE is not harmful to patent economics). But see Silverstein, supra note 195, at 26466 (discussing how overbroad patents have stifled innovation).
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period that the flexible bar approach to PHE of Hughes I was in effect technology has advanced at a faster rate than ever before. 2 9 Whatever
the actual underlying reason for this phenomena, the facts apparently
belie the theory. As a more scientifically-oriented branch of the law,
such observation in apparent contradiction to an advanced theory
should wave a red flag to the proponents of the certainty argument that
210
something is amiss with their theory.
Second, when the scope of an inventor's patent protection is
increased, it naturally increases the value of a patent. 211 Thereby, with
increased value, it is probable that more money and effort will be
expended on making new technological advances. 212 Conversely,
narrowing the scope of patent protection merely encourages copying
with insubstantial variations that avoid the literal meaning of a patent's
claims but gives no incentive for investing time and money into

See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 641 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe present patent

2

law has supported a blossoming of technology-based industry in a competitive
environment that is conspicuous for its entrepreneurial vigor").

In order to become a registered patent agent or attorney, one must have a scientific
education. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (2000). Under the classic "scientific method," a theory is
first advanced to explain a natural phenomena. Then experiments are conducted and the
results observed. Then, the results are compared to the theory. If the results agree with the
theory, the theory is not discarded. However, if the results do not agree with the theory,
the theory is either discarded or reformulated to try to account for the observations. The
process is then reiterated ad infinitwn. Thereby, a theory is almost never proved to be
correct, but after a long time it can be accepted as true. Consider, for example, one of
Newton's basic theories of motion, the conservation of momentum: force equals mass times
acceleration (F=M x A). This theory cannot ever be unquestionably proven to be true, but
after some four hundred years of not being proved incorrect, it has been generally accepted
as a true "law" of motion.
211 Merges & Nelson, supra note 207, at 839. "The economic significance of a patent
depends on its scope .. " Id. For example, the value of Thomas Edison's patent on the
incandescent electric light bulb, U.S. Pat. No. 223,898, increased dramatically after the
courts construed it broadly in Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co.,
allowing the company to increase its market share from 40% to 75% in just two years. See
210

ARTHUR BRIGHT, THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 89 (1949); see also Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United

States Elec. Lighting Co., 47 F. 454 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891). Although Merges & Nelson's
article concludes that broad patents diminishes incentives for other inventors to continue to
invent in the same field, the authors qualify their conclusion to apply only to a small
number of extremely broad patents for so-called pioneering breakthrough inventions. See
Merges & Nelson, supra note 207, at 916.
z21See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 208, at 81 (questioning whether narrowing the scope of the
DOE will squelch the incentive to invest in research and development).
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developing truly new technology. 213
Therefore, limiting patent
protection by creating a complete bar under PHE serves not to promote
the advancement of the arts but merely the legal copying of established
technology.214 Such a policy, while possibly having positive short-term
effects on the marketplace by increasing competition, may ultimately
have negative long-term effects by slowing the development of new
technology. 215 With the advent of the information age and the
establishment of intellectual property as the ultimate driver of the
modern first-world economy, such an effect can only be detrimental to
the United States economy in the long run.21 6
One final argument against the strict bar, the "After-Arising
Technology" argument, proceeds as follows.21 7 Under PHE, a patentee is
estopped from reclaiming what he has expressly disclaimed in order to
obtain the patent.218 However, one can only expressly disclaim that

213 See,

e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 626-28 (Linn, J. dissenting). But see Merges & Nelson, supra
note 207, at 908-09 (reaching the opposite conclusion for a relatively small group of broad,
pioneer patents).
214 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 626-28 (Linn, J., dissenting) (positing that "the majority's new rule
hands the unscrupulous copyist a free ride... ").
215See id. at 639 (Newman, J., dissenting). "It is generally agreed that long-term economic
growth requires a policy framework that encourages the creation and commercialization of
new technologies, as contrasted with a policy that facilitates appropriation of the creative
product, lest the creative product dry up in the face of too-easy appropriation." Id.; see also
Merges & Nelson, supra note 207, at 874-79 (discussing the positive effects of narrow patent
scope on market competition).
216 See genierally Merges & Nelson, supra note 207. "[T]he following general points seem to
be widely accepted: First, increases in research and development expenditures yield more
inventions. Second, the larger numbers of inventions from increased research and
development have a positive effect on future productivity growth. And third, productivity
growth is important for economic well-being." Id. at 878 (citations omitted). "The new
technologies, new processes, and new products that constitute intellectual property now
form the economic bedrock of international trade and national wealth."
FRED
WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARs: THE BATrLE TO OWN THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 3 (1994).

"In the competition for world markets, it is the nation that innovates best and has the
means to both encourage and protected those innovations that will provide the jobs and the
highest standard of living for its citizens." Id. at 271.
217 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
This
argument is recognized as a potential problem by the Supreme Court in its WarnerJenkinson decision. Id. The argument is also discussed in Judge Rader's dissent in Festo. See
Festo, 234 F.3d at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting).
211See supra text accompanying note 73.

But see Chandler, supra note 28, at 501-08

(concluding that principles of equitable estoppel provide an inadequate justification for
PHE).
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which exists at the time of the amendment. 219 Therefore, the inventor
cannot be expressly disclaiming future technologies because he cannot
know them to begin with.220 The DOE, on the other hand, applies at the
time of infringement, not the time of amendment. 221 Therefore, because
of the temporal shift between the occurrence of estoppel and the
application of the DOE, there is the potential for after-arising technology
that may literally fall within the region of material surrendered at
amendment, but not temporally.22 2 Since the inventor could not have
disclaimed it, he cannot then be estopped from claiming the equivalence
of the material. 2 3 To cause PHE to be an absolute bar in all situations,
however, would not allow the courts to consider the effects of afterarising technology. 224 Therefore, the wooden approach promulgated by
the Federal Circuit, in Festo, denies the patentee the equitable
consideration he deserves. 225
B. Analysis of a Post-Festo Application: Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space
226
Systems/Loral, Inc.
The recent Lockheed Martin decision is a perfect example of why the
Festo decision is wrong, and why the Supreme Court should overrule it
to re-establish the flexible bar approach to PHE. The decision highlights
how the Festo rule is too blunt an instrument to use where fine
'19 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 620 (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that "[bly definition, applicants
could not have surrendered something that did not even exist at the time of the claim
amendment, namely after-arising technology").
21 See id.
at 620.
221 See Warner-]enkinson, 520 U.S. at 37 (holding that "the proper time for evaluating
equivalency ... is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued").
m2 See, e.g., infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (discussing the after-arising
technology paradigm with respect to Hurlburtv. Scliillinger and Goodyear DentalVulcanite

Co. v. Davis).
m See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting). The syllogism proceeds as
follows: since future technology did not yet exist at the time the patentee made an
amendment, he could not yet have known about it.Id. If he did not know about it, the
patentee could not have knowingly or expressly disclaimed such technology.
Id.
Therefore, because he could not have knowingly or expressly disclaimed it, the patentee
should not be estopped from claiming after arising technology as an equivalent to his
patented technology. Id.
22 See, e.g., id. at 593 (Plager, J.,
concurring). Judge Plager considered the majority's strict
bar to be the "second best solution." Id. The outcome is to limit all equitable inquiry when
PHE applies. Id. Instead, Judge Plager proposes that the DOE and PHE should be entirely
within the realm of the equitable decisions of the judge. Id.
225See, e.g., id. at 622-23 (Linn, J., dissenting) (discussing the equitable function of the two
doctrines).
226
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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distinctions and nuances need to be considered.2 7 Because of the Festo
rule, the Lockheed ruling is contrary to established Supreme Court
precedent. 2
At issue in the Lockheed case was claim one of U.S. Patent No.
4,084,772 for a gyroscopic satellite attitude controller.22 9 The element at
issue was element 'b', which was amended twice during prosecution.
Originally, element 'b' read:
"means for rotating said wheel in
2°
accordance with a predetermined sinusoidal variation."
The Examiner rejected the original claim on obviousness grounds.231
The Applicant then amended claim one to read: "means for rotating said
wheel in accordance with a predetermined [sinusoidal variation] rate
2 32
schedule which varies sinusoidally over the orbit."
The Examiner again rejected the claim for obviousness, apparently
because prior art disclosed sinusoidally varied rate schedules for satellite
attitude controllers. 3 The Applicant amended claim one a second time
to read:
"means for rotating said wheel in accordance with a
predetermined rate schedule which varies sinusoidally over the orbit at
the orbital frequency of the satellite . . . ."2 This version was accepted
2 35
by the Examiner and was the form at issue in the subsequent litigation.
The overall question of the litigation was whether the means used by
Space Systems/Loral, Inc. ("SSL") to vary the rotation of a similar
gyroscopic satellite attitude controller was either literally the same or
equivalent to the means claimed by Lockheed.23 The district court held
that, as a matter of law, the SSL device neither used the same literal
means nor the equivalent means for controlling the sinusoidal variation

22 7

See itifra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
2 Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1319-20.
2w Id. at 1326.
231

Id.

232Id.

(emphasis added). The bracketing and underlining is the usual method used during
prosecution to show what material has been deleted [bracketed] and what material has
been added (underlined) from the last form of the language. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2000). It
is used here to similarly point out the differences between the succeeding forms of the
claims.
"'3Lockheed Martii, 249 F.3d at 1326.
2u Id. (emphasis added).
M Id.
2m Id. at 1325.
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of the gyroscope's rotation. 237 Lockheed appealed this holding, arguing
that the district court improperly decided the question of equivalency, a
28
question of fact, that should have been submitted to the jury.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling,
but for different reasons. 239 Whereas the district court relied on the
function-way-result test, the Federal Circuit panel relied on PHE and
Festo to reach the same result.240 After laying out the basic Festo analysis
algorithm, the court reiterated that, under Festo, a court may not inquire
as to what the applicant has surrendered with his amendments, because
any limiting amendment made for reasons related to patentability act as
an absolute bar to asserting the DOE. 241 Therefore, the court coldly
concluded that, since the element at issue had been limited by a
narrowing amendment made to overcome a rejection, there could be no
equivalents for that element, whatsoever. 242 Because there was no literal
infringement as a matter of law, and because there could be no
equivalents for that element under Festo, the court affirmed the district
court's ruling that SSL did not infringe Lockheed's patent.243

37The district court was correct to find that there was no literal infringement. In its
Markinan hearing, the court found that the sinusoidal variation of the '722 patent was
limited to a sinusoidal variation that passed through zero twice during a full period. See id.
The sinusoidal variation of the SSL device, however, never passed through zero. Id at 1322.
Therefore, there could be no literal infringement. Since the claim is a means-plus-function
claim, the court was correct to limit the means claimed to the means disclosed in the
disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994); see also Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo Surgery,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a means-plus-function claim is limited
to the means disclosed in the patent and their equivalents). Lockheed did not contest this
finding, so it is assumed that the "twice through zero" limitation imposed by the district
court was valid. Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1322-23.
The district court also found no equivalence as a matter of law. See id. at 1322. The
court applied the function-way-result test and found that, although the functions and
results were essentially the same, the way was not essentially the same. Id. The court
reasoned that because the Lockheed gyroscope changed rotational directions twice during
its cycle, i.e., the sinusoidal function that controlled the rotational speed passed through
zero twice in a full period, and because the SSL gyroscope never changed rotational
direction, i.e., the sinusoidal control of the rotational speed never passed through zero, then
the two ways of controlling the attitude were materially different. Id. Since the issue
equivalency is a question of fact, the court apparently concluded that no reasonable jury
could find equivalence between the two sinusoidal variations. Id.
23 Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1323.
39ld. at
240Id. at

1327.

1326-27.
1326.
242Id. at 1327.
243Id. at 1323.
241 Id. at
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The panel that decided this case applied the law of Festo correctly
and, in so doing, identified the problem with Festo's absolute bar.
Lockheed argued that the amendments to element b' were added
because the Examiner cited prior art that disclosed satellite attitude
controllers that varied sinusoidally with periods of something other than
the satellite's orbital frequency, explaining the second amendment,
which added the sinusoidal period limitation. 244 The first amendment,
which substantively only adds the "rate" limitation, was probably made
inresponse to a Section 112, paragraph 2 rejection, because without the
word "rate" in the claim, it would have been unclear what was being
varied according to the sinusoidal function. 245 Neither of the reasons for
the two amendments have anything to do with whether the sine function
passes through zero.
Focusing on the isolated issue of equivalence between a sinusoidal
function that passes through zero and one that does not, the application
of the Festo absolute bar completely missed the very real and important
nuances of the case. The applicant was not surrendering or disclaiming
anything in relation to whether the sine function passes through zero. 246
Instead, the applicant had surrendered and disclaimed:
first, a
sinusoidal variation of something other than the rate of rotation of the
gyroscopes, and second, a sine function that did not have a
geosynchronous period. 247 However, based on the Festo rule, the court
did not even consider what material the applicant was actually
surrendering with his limiting amendments. 248 Under Festo, the court
must ignore all of these considerations and blindly apply the absolute
PHE bar. 249
Under a more sensible legal scheme, this issue should have been
remanded to the district court for a factual determination of whether the
sinusoidal gyroscopic progression that does not pass through a zero
velocity was equivalent to one that does. Such a scheme must take into
account what subject matter the applicant actually disclaimed with a
244Lockheed

Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
In the case of the preferred embodiment, a satellite in geosynchronous orbit, the period is
one day, or roughly 24 hours. Id.
2 One of the requirements for a claim is that it "particularly points out" that which is
being
claimed. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (1994).
246
See supra notes 237,244-45 and accompanying text.
247See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text (showing the amendments made to the
claim during prosecution).
243See supra notes 24142 and accompanying text.
249
See supra notes 24142 and accompanying text.
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limiting amendment. Where the prosecution record is not silent, such
determinations are well within the power of the courts. Where the
record is silent, the court is well-founded to apply a strict bar, as
propounded by Warner-Jenkinson, because the patentee has not
established the reasons for the amendment. 250
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. The Supreme Court Should Reverse the Festo Decision in Part and
Establisha Specific Analysis using the Flexible Bar Approach
The Supreme Court should take this opportunity to assert that it has
ultimate control over the public policy direction of the patent law. In
Warner-Jenkinson, the Court strongly reaffirmed the deeply rooted policy
that the DOE is necessary to adequately protect the patentee's rights
from unscrupulous copyists. 251 The Federal Circuit's Festo decision has
essentially created a backdoor to thwart the Supreme Court's public
policy pronouncement by defining essentially all limiting amendments
as substantially related to patentability and creating a strict bar for all
such amendments.252 The Federal Circuit has thus found an alternative
method of effectively eviscerating the DOE in order to further a public
policy currently in favor with a majority of that court, but not supported
by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Supreme Court should make the
most of the opportunity to reclaim its control over the direction of the
public policy underlying patent law by not simply affirming or
overruling a small portion of the Festo holding, but enunciating a wellreasoned decision that overrules part of the Federal Circuit's decision,
but affirms other parts.
1. Amendments to Overcome Section 112 Amendments Are Not
Substantial Reasons Related to Patentability
The first issue the Supreme Court should address is what types of
amendments are "substantial" enough to act as a strict bar to

2w Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). Under WarnerJenkinson, a court is to apply a strict bar to equivalents where the record is silent regarding
the reasons for an amendment. Id.; see also supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 26 n.3 (1997) (outlining some of the history of the
DOE since 1854). In response to the petitioner's invitation to rule that the DOE should be
discarded, the court stated, "[w]e decline that invitation." Id. at 21.
252 By defining all Section 101 and Section 112 amendments as substantially related to
patentability, the Festo ruling makes essentially all limiting amendments a reason to apply
the strict bar to equivalents. See, e.g., supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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equivalents. Where the Federal Circuit and the patent bar, in general,
have gone awry is in ignoring a single word in the Warner-Jenkinson
decision: substantial. 2 3 It is clear from Wamer-Jenkinson that where a
claim amendment was not made to overcome the prior art, it may
completely preclude infringement by equivalents.2 4 However, it also
appears evident that such amendments should only preclude
equivalents where the reason related to patentability is substantial.M
The Supreme Court should emphasize the substantiality element of the
Warner-Jenkinson decision by ruling that amendments made to gain
compliance with Section 112 are not substantial reasons related to
patentability, but are merely formalistic requirements. 256 The reasoning

23

3 See, e.g., Biovail Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying the

Festo decision without regard to the substantiality of an amendment); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (considering only whether an amendment

was made to meet the statutory requirements); Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear
Corp., 238 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (ignoring the substantiality element).
25 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
255
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
- 35 U.S.C. §112 (1994). The possible Section 112 rejections are generally concerned with
the phraseology of a claim:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of
the case admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form.
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent
form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then
specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed ....
A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a
reference, in the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set
forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for any
other multiple dependent claim ....
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure ....
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is that Section 112 rejections are not substantial reasons relating to
patentability because they can be generally be overcome, if by no other
means, by adding new subject matter via a continuation-in-part
application and accepting a later application date.257 Since Section 112
rejections can be overcome without necessarily giving up subject matter,
they are not substantial reasons related to patentability. 2
They are
merely formal requirements because their function is compliant with the
public notice function of the patent quid pro quo, and they do not go to
the substance of what scope of subject mater the inventor is actually
allowed to claim. 2 9 Therefore, the Court should hold that only
amendments made for reasons that lie at that heart of the patentability of
the subject matter are substantial enough to apply a strict bar, not
amendments that are made merely for formal requirements to gain a
260
patent.
2. Prosecution History Estoppel Should Only be a "Strict Bar" Against
Expanding the Limitations or Elements Added, Not the Whole
Element Per Se
When the Supreme Court hears the Festo case, it should keep the
underlying reasons for PHE in mind when formulating its decision,
namely, to prevent patentees from using the courts to recapture subject
matter that they were required to abandon in order to receive the
patent. 261 The competing rational given for the absolute bar, i.e., to
promote the public's certainty as to what is covered by the patent,
should not be allowed to overshadow the more deeply established
reasoning. Although public certainty is an important aspect of the
claims, it must be balanced against the inventor's right to protect his
35 U.S.C. §112. The M.P.E.P. includes a non-exhaustive list of twenty-one specific issues for
Section 112 rejections, most of which are tied to unacceptable phraseology, not to the
substance of what the invention is. See M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(a)-(v) (2000).
257 See generally M.P.E.P. § 2163-63.07 (2000) (discussing the written description
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112); id. at § 201.08 (discussing Continuation-In-Part
applications); id. at § 201.11 (citing Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177 F.2d 583,
587 (2d. Cir. 1949)).
-See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
2s9See, e.g., Chemcast Corp. v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing
the public notice function of the best mode requirement of Section 112); Gould v.
Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (discussing the public notice function of the
enablement requirement of § 112); Ex parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608 (Bd. of Patent App.
1993) (discussing the public notice function of the particularity requirement of § 112).
2-o 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994); see supra note 158 (explaining these sections).
21 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning used for the
inception of the estoppel doctrine).
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invention and any obvious variations thereon. 262 As noted in Graver
Tank, and approvingly mentioned in Warner-Jenkinson, a legal
interpretation that limits a patent's protection to the literal meanings of
the words on the page renders a patent practically worthless because
literal infringement is the rare exception in patent cases that actually go
to trial.263 Instead, the federal government should aggressively uphold
its end of the patent bargain. 264
Under the law existing prior to the Festo decision, the need for public
certainty was adequately served by the function-way-result test, the allelements rule, and a more "flexible" use of PHE.265 Where an accused

product does not contain each of the elements of the patented subject
matter, the all-elements rule precludes the finding of equivalents as a
matter of law. 266 Only after satisfying the all-elements rule may
equivalents be considered. 267 Where the prosecution history shows that
the inventor clearly gave up subject matter in order to avoid the prior
art, either for anticipation or obviousness, it is only fair to estop the
patentee from reclaiming such matter.268
Furthermore, where the
prosecution history shows that inventors simply disclaimed subject
matter with an unexplained limiting amendment, they should not be
allowed to recapture the disclaimed subject matter through the court
systems at the expense of the public, who it is assumed relied on the
disclaimer. 269 However, where inventors have given up subject matter
22 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-30 (1997)
(considering the balance between the DOE and PHE).
2 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
The Graver Tank Court stated:
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the
mercy of verbalism and would be suboridinating substance to form. It
would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster
concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the
primary purposes of the patent system.
Id.
2 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government promises to
grant the inventor a limited right to exclude competition for a limited time in exchange for
the inventor's public teaching of his newly created knowledge).
20 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40 (discussing what linguistic frameworks are
allowable for formulation of the equivalency tests).

MSee id. at 29.
267 See id.

w See, e.g., Legget v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259 (1879). ("The allowance of claims once
formally abandoned by the applicant, in order to get his letters patent through, is the
occasion of immense frauds against the public.").
2w See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 33.
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for a specifically stated reason and disclaim only a limited aspect of the
many possible aspects of an element of their invention, the courts should
not punish them by restricting them from claiming equivalency to an
aspect that they did not actually disclaim.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should establish an absolute bar, not
to equivalents of the modified element, but to equivalents to the
modification, or the added limitation itself. With this modification to the
Federal Circuit's ruling, an analysis for equivalents and estoppel would
proceed as follows. The courts must first determine whether the accused
device meets the minimum requirements of the all-elements rule by
having all of the claimed elements of the patented invention.270 If so,
then the court must next consider any PHE.2 In so doing, the first step
should be to define as a matter of law exactly what subject matter the
applicant relinquished during prosecution and what portions of the
claims are affected by the relinquished subject matter. 272 Then, PHE
should strictly bar the patentee from reclaiming the subject matter that
the court has determined that the patentee relinquished, unless the
patentee can show that the limiting amendment was not made for
substantial reasons of patentability.273 Only where the record is silent as
to why a limitation was added or what subject matter was relinquished
should the courts apply a per se strict bar to equivalents for the entire
element without trying to discern what material the applicant actually
surrendered.
3. Prosecution History Estoppel Should Remain a "Strict Bar" to
Reclaiming Material that the Patentee Expressly Disclaimed in Order
to Obtain the Patent
Finally, the Court should refine the Federal Circuit's definition of the
"strict bar" as applied to the DOE, and retain it as a strict bar against
Vo See id. at 29-30.

course, if the accused device does not have all of the elements of the patented
invention, then there can be no infringement as a matter of law, and the inquiry goes no
further. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
m This step is necessary because the primary function of PHE is to prevent a patentee from
regaining via the courts what he was forced to relinquish during prosecution in order to
obtain the patent. See stipra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Therefore, in order to
achieve the goal of the estoppel, the court must first define what was relinquished before
proceeding. This step is analogous to the Markinan hearing, which is used to define the
terms of a patent before proceeding to consider infringement. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
2n See, e.g., supranotes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court used a strict
bar against disclaimed prior art in Carrigan).
271 Of
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reclaiming material that the patentee expressly disclaimed during
prosecution. This is necessary because both the majority and dissents in
Festo have valid points that need conciliation.274 On one hand, the Festo
majority is correct in stating that the Supreme Court decisions from the
golden age of patent jurisprudence often referred to using PHE as a
"strict bar" to equivalents. 275 On the other hand, the dissent raises a
valid point that the Court has also considered equivalency for amended
claim limitations in spite of the "strict bar" slogan. 276 However, these
two apparently divergent observations are reconcilable if one looks one
step further.
In the cases where the Supreme Court applied the strict bar without
even considering any equivalents to the claim element at issue, the
accused technology was clearly part of the prior art that the patentee had
disclaimed in order to obtain the patent. 277 Therefore, it was unnecessary
to consider any after-arising equivalents, and the Court was able to
apply PHE as a "strict bar" to the accused technology. 2 This analysis,
however, does not preclude the finding of equivalence for a narrowed
claim where the accused device was not part of the prior art, but instead
is an obvious variation of the patented technology at issue. This was
exactly the situation the Court faced in Goodyear Dental, where the
accused cellulose technology was not a part of the prior art, but arose
after the patent issued. 279 Similarly, in Hurlbut, the accused technology
was an after-arising obvious variation on the patented technology.28
Although Hurlbut involved a disclaimer to the prior art instead of an
amendment, this process is equivalent to amending the claim but is just a
procedural convenience of creating a claim limitation without having to
go into reissue proceedings. 281 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court
271See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text (comparing the arguments on either side of

the issue).
2n See, e.g. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Hubbell v. United
States, 179 U.S. 77 (1900); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886).
276See, e.g., supra notes 65-66, 79-80 and accompanying text.
2'7See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558,
601-10 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Michel, J., dissenting) (presenting an extensive detailed
discussion of the Supreme Court precedent).
Z78See id.
2 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
2
OSee supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
" See generally M.P.E.P. § 1490 (8th ed. 2001). This type of disclaimer is now called a
Statutory Disclaimer. Id. A Statutory Disclaimer may be filed where the patentee has
reason to believe the claim is too broad. Id. Therefore, the disclaimer produces the same
substantive result as narrowing a claim during prosecution or reissue in order to overcome
a prior art rejection. Id. Although a Statutory Disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 today only
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considered whether the accused technology, which was after-arising
technology, was equivalent to the patented technology even though PHE
applied to the claim elements at issue.m
From the above distinction, comes an obvious solution to the
apparent conflict. The Supreme Court should define the strict bar that
arises from PHE as preventing a court from finding equivalency to
material that was expressly disclaimed as part of the prior art in order to
obtain or maintain a valid patent.283 However, the Court should not
extend the "strict bar" to either after-arising technology or technology
that was not expressly disclaimed in order to obtain or maintain a valid
patent. 2 4 Thereby, the "estoppel" to reclaiming what has been expressly
disclaimed is strict as to what was actually considered and disclaimed,
but the equitable nature of the two doctrines is niaintained to allow for
inquiry where necessary. 5

Under this solution, the Court could maintain the burden on the
patentee to produce evidence of why an amendment was made by
retaining the Warner-Jenkinson presumption. 2 6 At the same time, such a
holding would retain some benefits of having a patent by putting some
of the onus on the near-copyist to show that his technology is actually
part of that which is disclaimed.W Under the proposed reasoning, if the

allows the patentee to disclaim a whole claim at a time, the idea is the same as in the time
of Hurlbut,where the patentee only disclaimed a small part of the claim's scope in order to
avoid invalidity. ld.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1994).
2

See supra notes 61-66, 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing Goodyear Vulcanite and

Hurlburt,
respectively).
23
See generally Chandler, supra note 28, at 513-18. Note that this is not quite the same as the
well established rule that the patentee cannot claim via the DOE what was already part of
the prior art. Id. That rule requires the court to determine what technology was in the
prior art at the time of issue. Id. PHE, on the other hand, acts more like claim estoppel
form of res judicata, whereby the court is precluded from reopening the PTO examiner's
prior decision regarding known prior art. Id.
MBy using the phrase "obtain or maintain a valid patent," this note is attempting to clarify
that PHE applies equally to all limiting changes made to a claim element, whether by
amendment during prosecution, amendment during reissue, statutory disclaimer, or
otherwise. Thereby, the substance of PHE is maintained no matter what terminology is
used.
21 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 600
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Michel, J., dissenting) (discussing the estoppel aspect of PHE); id.
at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing same).
216
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,33 (1997) (placing the
burden on the patentee to show reasons for an amendment).
27 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) (placing the burden of proof on the party trying to show
that a patent is invalid). Also, if the technology is truly novel and non-obvious, let the
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accused technology is part of the prior art, then the patentee is clearly
estopped from asserting equivalents over prior art technology.2M
Furthermore, the patentee is also strictly barred from asserting
equivalents to subject matter that he disclaimed during prosecution. To
completely prevent the patentee from asserting a claim of equivalence to
all after-arising technology, however, clearly extends the estoppel
doctrine from one of disclaimer, to one of blind preclusion from all
obvious variants, which would be unpatentable by the copyist
anyway. 289 Therefore, a holding that defines the scope of PHE in this
manner maintains the balance between the public need for notice and the
inventor's right to his invention, while preventing PHE itself from taking
29°
on a life of its own.

competitor obtain his own patent. See infra note 289 (discussing an alternative theory of the
DOE).
2 This is nothing more than what the Court held in Sheppard v. Carrigan. 116 U.S. 593, 598
(1886).
n See Chandler, supra note 28, at 500. "Automatically providing the same relief under the
doctrine of equivalents as under literal infringement is as inequitable as treating the
prosecution history as an automatic bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents: both
actions replace judicial discretion with an inflexible rule." Id.
Although not the main subject of this Note, the system described herein also would
enable the development of an "obviousness" type rule for equivalents and estoppel. See,
e.g., Michel, supra note 25, at 143 (calling upon the patent bar to help the judiciary devise a
new formulation for the DOE). Under such a rule, if the near-copyist's technology is an
obvious variation of the patented technology, then he can not practice it because it is an
equivalent of the patentee's technology. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 28, at 488-95
(discussing the obviousness aspects of the doctrine of equivalents). Although the patentee
would almost surely not be entitled to all the profits of the near-copyist (since, by
definition, only part of the technology is his), he would be able to collect a portion
representative of his contribution unlawfully used. See generally id. If, on the other hand,
the near-copyist's technology is not obvious, then he is allowed to freely practice the
invention because it is his own, new invention. Id. Although not a clean, black-box type of
solution, such weighing of factors and molding of remedies is the everyday job of judges
sitting in equity, and should not be feared or ridiculed by the patent bench and bar. Id.
This would facilitate a more complete ownership of existing technology rights in afterarising technology by eliminating the gaps between ownership rights for successive steps
in a particular art: i.e., the technology is either old, which has already been subject to patent
rights, or it is new, which is also subject to patent rights. Id. Otherwise, there is a whole
realm of un-patentable technology called "obvious variations" that no one can really own,
but that also is completely dependent upon the patentee's own invention. Id. Since the
patentee's invention is essential for the territory of "obvious variants," it seems only
equitable that he should have some degree of control over that realm during the patent's
lifetime. See generally id.
2
% See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 575-78 (discussing the balance between the public and private
interests). There are also several other doctrines which can be used to limit the DOE. See
Michel, supra note 25, at 140-42 (discussing at least five different limiting rules on the
doctrine of equivalents).
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B. Example Application of Proposed Test: Lockheed Martin v. Space
Systems/Loral, Inc.
Although the proposed formulation may seem like mere sophistry
with respect to the Festo rule, the Lockheed case serves as a prime example
of the concrete difference between having an absolute bar apply to the
modified element and having an absolute bar apply to the added
limitation. 291 In Lockheed, the absolute bar of Festo led to a holding that is
contrary to the established purpose of PHE because the Festo rule
required the absolute bar to apply to the whole claim element, i.e., the
control system that varied the rate of spin of the gyroscopic controllers
according to a geosynchronous sinusoidal function. 292 If, instead, the
court had first defined what was relinquished by the amendments, the
result would have been dramatically different. The claim amendments
surrendered two things: first, sinusoidal variation of something other
than the rate of rotation, and second, sinusoidal variation at a frequency
other than the orbital frequency of the satellite. 293 Therefore, the patentee
should be estopped from asserting equivalents to these limitations, i.e.,
first, he is estopped from claiming as equivalent a device that does not
sinusoidally vary the rate of rotation, and second, he is estopped from
claiming as equivalent a device that has a sinusoidal variation period
other than the orbital frequency of the satellite. With respect to these
two limitations, PHE should act as a strict bar, and the limitations must
be read literally.

291 Lockheed

Martin Corp. v. Space System/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314 (Fed Cir. 2001). It
might be argued that what went wrong in this case is not the Festo rule itself, but that the
panel did not properly distinguish between a claim "element" and a claim "limitation."
See, e.g., ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Tech. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 391 (N.D.Cal.
2000) (distinguishing Festo on the difference between an "element" and a "limitation").
Thus, the argument goes, had the court properly identified the elements to be the rate of
rotation and the sinusoidal period, then they would not have been barred by the Festo rule.
See, e.g., id. Although this argument is tempting because it nicely distinguishes Festo
without directly contradicting it, such face-saving tiptoeing around the real issue would
merely add to the confusion. Now is the time for the Supreme Court to plainly state that
the Federal Circuit missed the mark in Festo and overrule the decision before it can beget
any further mischief. Adding further legal distinctions and layers of analysis will make the
whole issue even less clear, and thereby completely defeat the reason the Festo rule was
propounded in the first place, i.e., to promote public certainty. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 558.

Instead, by pointing out the Federal Circuit's error now, the Supreme Court can finally give
the lower court the clear rules regarding the DOE and PHE for which they have been
desperately begging.
2

See Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1326-27.

93 Id.

at 1326.
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As explained above, however, the issue in Lockheed was not the
equivalency of the rate of rotation or the period of the sinusoidal
variation. 294 Instead, the issue was the equivalency of a sinusoidal
function that passes through zero with one that does not.295 Because the
two amendments at issue did not have anything to do with whether the
sinusoidal function passes through zero, they do not act as any kind of
indication that the patentee had dedicated to the public all sinusoidal
functions that do not pass through zero. Therefore, under these
circumstances, the court should have made a factual finding as to
whether the two functions are equivalent. By applying the strict bar to
the element itself, however, the Festo rule completely missed this nuance
and caused the wrong outcome.
V. CONCLUSION

The Festo decision dramatically changed patent law by overturning
at least eighteen years of Federal Circuit precedent.296 It also effectively
eviscerated the spirit of the Warner-Jenkinson decision by establishing
PHE as a way to completely confine the DOE by "woodenly" applying it
in all situations without considering the equities involved by the
circumstances of each individual case. 297 This Note asserts that the
Federal Circuit has gone too far with this holding. Therefore, this Note
proposes that the Supreme Court overturn the decision in order to
redirect the policy decisions made by the Federal Circuit in a manner
more consistent with Warner-Jenkinson and earlier Supreme Court
precedent. 298 More specifically, the Supreme Court should hold that
amendments made to overcome Section 112 rejections are not substantial
reasons related to patentability that give rise to a strict bar on
equivalents. 299
Instead, an amendment is substantially related to
patentability if it was entered for those issues that go to the heart of the
patentability of the subject matter itself, such as novelty and
obviousness. 300 However, amendments that were made merely for
reasons that deal with the statutory formalities, such as particularity and
related to patentability.301
distinctness, are not substantially
Furthermore, this Note suggests that, even where amendments are made
m See supra text accompanying notes 291-93.
m See supra text accompanying notes 291-93.
296See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
2
" See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
2
" See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
w See supranotes 253-60 and accompanying text.
-m See supranotes 253-60 and accompanying text.
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to overcome rejections based on the prior art, a court must still inquire as
to what the applicant actually surrendered at the time of the amendment
and limit the estoppel to those portions of the art.3°2 Then, a strict bar
may be applied to that subject matter that the court has determined the
applicant actually surrendered.30 3 A per se strict bar to all equivalents of
a claim element that has been narrowed by a limiting amendment should
only be applied where the patentee cannot point to any reasons in the
record for the added limitation. 304 If the Supreme Court takes these
steps, it will fill the hole identified by the Federal Circuit, in Festo, with a
conclusive and pro-active reassertion that, in the struggle between the
DOE and PHE, the public policy favoring aggressive protection of a
patentee's rights cannot be eviscerated by the public policy to give
effective notice to the public.
Thomas P. Riley

3w
30

See supra notes 261-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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